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Chapter 2 
 
Diplomacy in a provincial setting: The East India Companies in seventeenth-
century Bengal and Orissa 
 
Guido van Meersbergen 
 
 
 
On 22 October 1634, the clerk responsible for keeping the diary drawn up in Batavia Castle 
(Dagh-Register gehouden in’t Casteel Batavia) diligently summarized the latest intelligence 
about trade in the Bay of Bengal. His employer, the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 
had just commenced trading operations in the Mughal provinces of Bengal and Orissa, and a 
barque arriving that day carried initial snippets of information concerning the first Dutch 
factory in the region, recently established in the small port town of Hariharpur.1 So far trade 
had been slack, hampered by a shortage of merchandise and high prices. This unpromising 
yet otherwise rather ordinary entry took a surprising turn, however, when discussing 
another recent entrant into the Bengal trade, the English East India Company.2 The building 
of an English factory in Hariharpur had commenced with the consent of the nawab 
(provincial governor) of Orissa, but, according to Dutch reports, once the structure was 
nearly completed, the nawab had it entirely ‘destroyed and pulled down again’.3 The reason 
given for this reversal of fortunes was that ‘a certain English merchant named Mr. Cartrijcq’ 
and ‘the wife of a prominent Moor there residing’ were found to be ‘having carnal 
conversation through a large hole in the wall of said lodge’. To make things worse, when 
Cartwright left on Company business to nearby Balasore, he had attempted to take the 
married woman with him.4 
 While we cannot be certain of its accuracy,5 the story of the amorous encounter, and 
of Ralph Cartwright’s alleged arrest, imprisonment, and payment of a thousand rupees to 
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obtain his release, was deemed credible by Batavia’s administrators.6 Although it seems 
inconsequential at first, the Cartwright episode captures a larger truth about the East India 
Companies in seventeenth-century Mughal India. As this chapter argues, the Companies’ 
global operations depended to an important extent on what I term ‘provincial diplomacy’, a 
mode of political negotiation structured through political and social interactions between 
Company agents and lower-tier officials in the empire’s frontier regions. Such exchanges 
mainly took place at provincial courts, including Rajmahal and Dhaka, as well as in port 
towns such as Hugli. Given the centrality of interpersonal relations on the ground, 
controversial conduct such as that attributed to Ralph Cartwright could make or break 
diplomatic arrangements. Provincial diplomacy was essential to the operations of the 
Companies because the interests and attitudes of local government representatives were 
just as significant, if not more so, for the everyday practice of trade on the ground as 
imperial commands in the form of farmans; a situation that stemmed in part from the 
considerable degree of autonomy enjoyed by Mughal officials in the eastern provinces.7 
Port towns and provincial courts were also, in quantitative terms, the sites where most of 
the diplomatic action happened.8 My focus in this chapter on negotiations at the local and 
provincial levels of the Mughal administration argues against the common tendency to 
concentrate attention exclusively on diplomatic proceedings at the highest seat of power. 
This trend is nowhere clearer than in the steady stream of publications focused on the 
embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the court of Jahangir (r. 1605-1627).9 While of course 
important, such an emphasis on what was happening in the imperial centre can only 
illuminate part of the intricate relationship between diplomacy, trade, and violence that 
shaped the Companies’ presence in South Asia. Sustained attention to provincial and local 
sites of political negotiation is needed to fill in the picture. 
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 By calling attention to diplomacy in provincial settings, this chapter seeks to advance 
two further goals. First, it aims to bring East India Company history into closer conversation 
with the flourishing field of early modern diplomatic history.10 Second, it addresses the ways 
in which the Companies became integrated into local political contexts. Borrowing from a 
range of disciplines, ‘New Diplomatic History’ has called attention to the prominent role of 
social networks, cultural practices, and non-state and non-elite actors in the development of 
early modern diplomatic exchange.11 In the process, our notion of early modern diplomacy 
has been markedly expanded. No longer viewing diplomacy as the exclusive preserve of high 
politics bounded by a Eurocentric chronology, scholars have also begun to take account of 
the many contributions of non-European actors to the wider development of diplomatic 
institutions and practices.12 While the contours of a ‘diplomatic turn’ are increasingly 
evident in scholarship on the VOC and EIC, neither these organizations nor the Asian polities 
they interacted with have thus far played more than a minor role in the renewal of 
diplomatic history.13 
 My discussion of Company diplomacy in the Mughal provinces of Bengal and Orissa 
combines exploration of diplomacy at ‘sub-state levels’ with the recent interest in ‘sub-state 
diplomatic actors’ such as trading companies.14 I start by examining the foundations of the 
relationship between the Companies and the Mughal administration in Bengal and Orissa 
through a focus on Ralph Cartwright’s mission to the provincial court in Cuttack (Katak) in 
1633.15 Addressing questions of diplomatic communication and cultural commensurability, 
this section argues that provincial diplomacy was characterized far more by immediacy than 
by cultural distance.16 The next section argues that the Companies gradually became 
incorporated into the Mughal political landscape as a result of localized conflicts in which 
provincial authorities sought to exploit European naval power. It does so by charting the 
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VOC’s entanglement in Mughal imperial politics during the mid-century war of succession 
(1657-1659) and its immediate aftermath, as successive Mughal governors of Bengal sought 
to co-opt the Company’s military resources. In this way, it mirrors some of the patterns 
sketched out by Peter Good’s chapter in this volume; although here the focus is on the role 
played by provincial officials. 
 
Enter the Companies 
 
The account of Cartwright’s mission to the nawab’s court in Cuttack, written by the English 
quartermaster William Bruton and published in London in 1638, offers a useful starting 
point for an analysis of how Company diplomacy functioned in a provincial setting. Bruton’s 
detailed description of Cartwright’s mission provides a picture of what may well have been a 
typical diplomatic encounter at a provincial court, and allows us to contrast it to diplomatic 
proceedings at the seat of imperial power in capital cities such as Agra and Delhi. Compared 
to the better-known English and Dutch embassies to the Mughal imperial centre – including 
Roe’s mission to the court of Jahangir (1615-1618) and Dircq van Adrichem’s embassy to the 
court of Aurangzeb (1662) – diplomatic engagements at the lower rungs of the imperial 
hierarchy stand out for their more strikingly ad hoc character, decentralized decision-
making, and informal rituals of interaction.17 They were also more specific in focus. To a far 
greater degree than diplomacy at the imperial court, provincial diplomacy dealt directly with 
the regulation of, and disputes arising from, site-specific political and commercial 
interactions. In the case of Cartwright’s 1633 journey to Cuttack, what was at stake were 
English rights to trade freely within the nawab’s domains and the containment of both the 
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EIC’s potential for violent action and the harmful consequences to local trade of Anglo-
Portuguese conflict. 
The Mughal Empire, founded in 1526, came to comprise most of northern India during 
the reign of Akbar (r. 1556-1605). The Sultanate of Bengal was conquered in 1575-1576 and 
the annexation of Orissa followed in 1593, although imperial authority in the region 
remained hotly contested until the 1610s.18 Once incorporated into the empire, the Mughal 
province (subah) of Bengal was governed by a viceroy or provincial governor (subahdar) 
appointed by the emperor. Orissa was made into a separate province in 1607, although it 
continued to fall under the authority of the governor of Bengal, his deputy, or someone 
recommended by him.19 Reflecting its importance as one of the empire’s richest provinces, 
the government of Bengal was only entrusted to noblemen of the highest rank, including 
imperial princes such as Shah Shuja (1639-1660) and other relatives of the reigning emperor 
such as Aurangzeb’s maternal uncle, Shaista Khan (1664-1678, 1679-1688). Traditionally 
regarded as a highly centralized empire, recent studies have argued for the relative 
autonomy of Mughal government in the provinces and its crucial reliance on the 
participation of local power holders.20 They have also stressed the vital importance of 
political and military support networks centred on princely households as a means by which 
members of the dynasty strengthened their own power bases.21 The point was picked up by 
contemporary European observers, who commented that some Mughal governors in the 
provinces ruled as if they were kings themselves.22 
Seventeenth-century Bengal retained the character of a frontier region, and internal 
resistance from subordinate chieftains as well as armed conflicts against neighbouring 
Assam and Arakan (comprising parts of modern-day Bangladesh and Myanmar) continued 
during the reigns of Shah Jahan (r. 1628-1658) and Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707).23 Bengal was 
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also the home of largely autonomous groups of Portuguese mercenaries and private 
traders, whose activities in the region predated the arrival of the Dutch and English 
Companies by about a century. Their presence created a precedent for the government’s 
dealing with Europeans. Due to their involvement in slave raiding, Portuguese freemen 
caused recurrent moments of tension in the relationship between the Estado da Índia and 
the Mughal state.24 In 1632 matters came to a head when Qasim Khan, then subahdar of 
Bengal, attacked Hugli, the principal Portuguese settlement in the region. His successful 
siege asserted Mughal control over the Ganges delta and curbed the political threat the 
defiant ‘Franks’ (firangis) posed to imperial authority.25 While Portuguese influence in 
Bengal before 1632 or the extent of its decline afterwards should not be overstated, the fall 
of Hugli nevertheless served to expedite the establishment of English and Dutch factories in 
the region from 1633 onwards.26 The Companies certainly did not lack encouragement from 
local authorities, who welcomed additional outside parties as means of expanding economic 
activity within their districts and boosting tax income.27 It was such ‘promises […] for 
Traffick, and to be Custome-free’ which encouraged John Norris, the EIC’s Agent on the 
Coromandel Coast, to dispatch Ralph Cartwright’s party to Orissa.28 (IMAGE 3 BELONGS 
WITH THIS PARAGRAPH, filename: 2 Guido SK-A-4282.jpg) 
Having set out from Masulipatnam aboard an Indian junk hired for the occasion, 
Cartwright, William Bruton, and six other Englishmen arrived in the small town of Harishpur 
Garh at the mouth of the Mahanadi river delta on 21 April 1633.29 Cartwright, Bruton, and a 
third EIC agent soon travelled onwards by river bark and by land to Cuttack, the capital of 
the Orissa subah, but not before fending off a surprise attack from the Pipli-based nachoda 
(captain) of a Portuguese-owned frigate.30 In parallel to Cartwright’s journey, the captain of 
this vessel, now detained by the English, also made his way to Cuttack to plead his case. 
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Arriving in Hariharpur, the three Englishmen were received by a nobleman named Mirza 
Momein, who accompanied them on their last day’s travel to the court of his master 
(referred to as ‘the King’ in Bruton’s account). Although Bruton’s text fails to mention the 
nawab’s name, it is likely that it would have been Mu’taqad Khan, a close confidant and 
possibly a foster brother of Shah Jahan, who served two stints as subahdar of Orissa during 
the latter’s reign, the first commencing in 1632.31 
On 1 May 1633, scarcely twelve hours after his arrival in Cuttack, Cartwright’s first of 
six audiences took place in the darbar (audience hall) of the stately palace built for the last 
Hindu ruler of Orissa, Mukunda Deva (r. 1559-1568).32 Attended by some 40 to 50 courtiers 
besides a hundred armed guards, the nawab maintained a sumptuous court which duly 
impressed Bruton. His detailed descriptions of the palace and the spatial configuration of 
the darbar underline the fact that provincial courts were essentially smaller versions of the 
royal household, with similar business conducted as in the emperor’s Diwan-i-Am or Hall of 
Public Audience.33 Bruton’s depiction of courtiers sitting cross-legged around the nawab and 
the English representative engaging in unmediated interaction with the ruler, however, 
suggests a level of proximity much greater than at Shah Jahan’s heavily scripted public 
audiences, where few Company envoys enjoyed the honour of being received, and 
opportunities for direct communication were extremely limited.34 Having been introduced 
by Mirza Momein, Cartwright bowed before the nawab, kissed his foot, and was directed to 
sit down beside the nawab’s brother. Next, the visitors offered up their somewhat modest 
assortment of gifts, consisting of 20 pounds each of cloves, mace, and nutmeg, small 
quantities of damask and cloth, a gilded mirror, a rifle and a double-barrelled pistol.35 
 Apparently without prior negotiations or indeed the composition of a written petition, 
Cartwright (or rather his interpreter) proceeded to explain the English requests to the 
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nawab and his counsellors, who conferred to discuss the matter on the spot. Together with 
the speedy arrangement of Cartwright’s reception, this direct handling of state affairs offers 
clear indications as to the impromptu nature of provincial diplomacy. Even more striking, 
certainly when compared to the rigid protocol of diplomatic audiences at the imperial court, 
is that during his second appearance at the darbar Cartwright not only had the audacity to 
walk out in the midst of proceedings (or so Bruton claimed), but also faced no consequences 
for doing so.36 Further evidence of the heightened degree of immediacy in this courtly 
encounter is provided by the absence of references to interactions with scribes and lower-
tier administrators, the two-way dialogue between Cartwright and the nawab, and the fact 
that the latter publicly authorized the parwana (decree) with his own seal in the presence of 
the English. What is more, when the nawab hosted a banquet for the principal noblemen 
under his command, he invited Cartwright to eat with the Muslim courtiers, summoned the 
Englishman to sit beside him, and personally clad him with a robe of honour. The 
significance of this personalized act of investiture was not lost on Bruton, who emphasized 
that the nawab ‘with his own hands did put it upon our Merchant’.37 Commonly referred to 
by its Arabic name of khil’at (or kelʽat), the granting of robes of honour was widespread in 
South Asia and adjacent regions as an important public ritual in which a superior gifted a 
subordinate with a special mark of favour as a means to establish or reaffirm bonds of 
loyalty and service.38 With this ceremonial gesture the nawab symbolically incorporated the 
English representative into his client network – a concrete reminder both of the continuity 
of languages of political authority between the imperial centre and provincial courts and of 
the close entanglement between diplomatic relationships and interpersonal ties. 
The Company’s request to trade in Orissa and the nawab’s decision to confiscate the 
Portuguese-owned vessel which the English had meant to seize for themselves were 
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conclusively dealt with during Cartwright’s third audience. It is by looking at these 
negotiations that the purposes of provincial diplomacy become more apparent. Persian 
merchants attending the court were invited to provide intelligence about English trading 
activities, the Company’s maritime strength, and its practice of seizing Indian ships not 
carrying a pass issued by the English, Dutch, or Danish. Given the tendency of all European 
participants in Indian Ocean trade to employ maritime force as a means to back their 
commercial ambitions, there is certainly something to be said for Bruton’s suggestion that it 
was the potential economic damage which the EIC could inflict by hampering commercial 
activity in Orissa that induced the nawab to grant Cartwright the desired exemption from 
custom duties and license to build a factory.39 Concern about English maritime strength 
certainly underpinned the nawab’s insistence that the English not seize any vessel belonging 
to the nawab or his subjects, nor attack any other ship within the boundaries of Orissa 
regardless of its origins. Asserting control over a potentially unruly outside element was also 
at work in the nawab’s demand that disputes between the English and his subjects were to 
be judged by himself, which came with the veiled admonition that the English were 
expected to ‘behav[e] themselves as Merchants ought to doe’.40 Contemporary Mughal 
edicts concerning the VOC confirm this picture. A parwana granted in 1636 by the subahdar 
of Bengal, Islam Khan Mashadi, stipulated that the Dutch should not hinder the Portuguese 
trading in Hugli and that they were not allowed to export gunpowder and saltpetre nor 
carry away Bengali slaves or workmen.41 In the same year, Shah Jahan issued a farman that 
sought to limit the Dutch presence in Bengal to no more than 30 unarmed men at a time.42 
While the threat of maritime force thus clearly played a role, Bruton’s explanation 
ignores the larger benefits that accrued to the Mughal administration as a result of its 
commercial policy vis-à-vis the Europeans. Cartwright agreed to provide English assistance 
In: Adam Clulow and Tristan Mostert (eds.), The Dutch and English East India Companies: Diplomacy, 
Trade and Violence in Early Modern Asia (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018). 
10 
 
to the nawab’s subjects when finding the latter ‘in distresse either by foule Weather, or in 
danger of Enemies’, and to supply them with hardware and victuals in case of need.43 Islam 
Khan decreed that local officials should have the first right to inspect and buy any exotic 
rarities imported by the VOC. And Shah Jahan roundly proclaimed that the Dutch were to be 
shown all favour because their trade would further enrich Bengal, enlarge his income, and 
bring profits to local administrators.44 The challenge for Mughal officials in the maritime 
provinces was to profit economically from the largely mutually beneficial relationship they 
forged with European traders, while reining in the potentially harmful effects of the latter’s 
presence in their domains. Often this meant exploiting competition between parties as well 
as identifying the right horse to back. During Cartwright’s stay in Cuttack, one Mir Qasim, 
governor of the coastal town of Balasore, initially spoke on behalf of the Pipli-based 
nachoda. Then, upon observing the turn of events, he shifted his support to the English, 
presented Cartwright with various gifts, and successfully induced the merchant to settle the 
EIC’s second factory in Orissa under his jurisdiction. Especially when customs duties had 
been assigned or farmed to a local official, the latter had every incentive to increase the 
volume of trade in the relevant district as a means to achieve higher returns on his 
investment. More generally, the imperial administration looked favourably upon European 
trade because it channelled much-needed quantities of precious metals into the Mughal 
economy.45 
Recounting the final audience at Cuttack on 8 May 1633, Bruton describes how ‘our 
Merchant (reverently) took his leave of the King, and the King (with his Nobles) did the same 
to him, wishing him all good successe in his affaires in his Countrey’.46 The picture that 
emerges in accounts such as these is of a provincial diplomacy characterized by mutuality 
and apparently unhindered by any serious form of cultural barrier. Save for a stock 
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reference to Cartwright’s initial refusal to kiss the nawab’s foot, the Englishmen’s 
participation in Mughal court ceremonial is nowhere problematized or made to appear less 
than self-evident. Indeed, the remark that the nawab and Cartwright were able to 
communicate in ‘Moores language’ – presumably referring to the colloquial Hindustani 
spoken in northern India, and here contrasted to the formal Persian used during court 
proceedings – serves to underline the impression that the principal actors in this encounter 
were conversant in the same diplomatic idiom.47 This seeming reciprocality in the 
communicative sphere was mirrored by the forging of mutually beneficial commercial 
relations. Still, so shortly after Qasim Khan’s startling attack on Hugli, few European 
observers would have failed to recognize that, ultimately, the terms of the diplomatic 
relationship were principally set by the nawab and the state power he represented. It was 
this message that in 1634 found its way into the Batavia Dagh-register in the form of the 
perhaps apocryphal story about the fate of the newly-built English Hariharpur factory. 
 
Co-opting the Companies 
 
In charting the establishment of diplomatic arrangements between representatives of the 
East India Companies and governors of the easternmost Mughal provinces during the 1630s, 
I have discussed the precarious balance between European attempts to exploit maritime 
power and the push by local authorities to rein it in. From the middle of the seventeenth 
century onwards, a succession of extraordinarily powerful subahdars of Bengal – the Mughal 
Prince Shah Shuja (1639-1660), the entrepreneur and general Mir Jumla48 (1660-1663), and 
the senior nobleman and uncle to the emperor, Shaista Khan (1664-1678, 1679-1688) – 
introduced a new element into the relationship, namely the demand for money, material, 
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and military support to be used to advance their geopolitical ends. Shaista Khan’s requests 
to the VOC’s High Government (Hoge Regering) in Batavia for naval support in the run-up to 
his campaign against Chittagong and Arakanese territories further east during the mid-
1660s are well known, described by Om Prakash as the VOC’s first ‘major involvement’ in a 
military operation carried out by the Mughal government against a neighbouring state or 
insubordinate vassal.49 Yet this was by no means the first occasion at which the imperial 
administration sought to co-opt the VOC’s maritime power. Similar requests of naval 
assistance against Arakan had been made by Shah Shuja in 1657 and Mir Jumla in 1660; 
again appeals issued by the provincial authorities, not the central government.50 
Furthermore, proposals discussed during Van Adrichem’s 1662 embassy to Delhi included a 
joint Mughal–Dutch attack on the Portuguese stronghold of Daman – a plan put forward by 
Aurangzeb but soon thereafter abandoned – as well as the emperor’s request for Dutch 
assistance in capturing Shah Shuja, his elder brother, who had gone missing after his flight 
to Arakan at the end of the Mughal war of succession.51 (IMAGE 4 WITH THIS PARAGRAPH, 
filename: 2 Guido Shaista Khan.jpg) 
This proposal, although it seems eccentric at first glance, was a natural continuation 
of the role forced upon the VOC over the course of the conflict, when the Company first 
became embroiled in imperial politics. The ad hoc exaction of material or military support 
from Company representatives in Bengal and elsewhere during the civil war and its 
aftermath is significant as it foreshadowed the more institutionalized forms of co-optation 
of European naval power that developed in later years. The best known examples of this are 
the convoying duties which Aurangzeb imposed on the Dutch, English, and French in the 
1690s and 1700s in an attempt to extend protection to his subjects engaged in maritime 
trade and hold the European Companies responsible for losses in the event of piracy on the 
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high seas.52 Furthermore, these examples fit a larger pattern of formidable Asian states 
drawing naval assistance from the Companies, visible at different points during the 
seventeenth century in relations with Safavid Iran, Tokugawa Japan, and Qing China.53 The 
next section traces this process of incorporation by focusing on the VOC’s role as a political 
actor in Mughal Bengal in the period leading up to and immediately following Aurangzeb’s 
consolidation of power. It was in the provinces rather than the court where the key action 
played out as VOC agents based in different parts of the empire had to deal locally with a 
host of conflicting political demands emanating from powerful officials representing the 
various warring parties. 
 The main events of the Mughal succession conflict can be swiftly summarized. By the 
late 1650s, Shah Jahan’s four adult sons – Dara Shukoh (1615-1659), Shah Shuja (1616-
1660?), Aurangzeb (1618-1707), and Murad Bakhsh (1624-1661) – each possessed personal 
client networks and extensive experience in provincial governance. When the reigning 
emperor fell ill in September 1657, Dara Shukoh, the heir-apparent and the only one among 
the princes present at court, quickly assumed command of day-to-day management of the 
empire.54 Upon hearing about their father’s indisposition, both Murad Bakhsh (subahdar of 
Gujarat and Malwa) and Shah Shuja (subahdar of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa) took the step of 
crowning themselves emperor. Shah Shuja led his troops in the direction of Agra, to be 
repelled near Varanasi by an imperial army sent by Dara Shukoh. Around the same time, 
Aurangzeb marched north from his government in the Deccan and joined forces with Murad 
Bakhsh.55 At the decisive battle of Samugarh on 29 May 1658, their combined armies 
defeated the imperial troops under Dara’s command, putting their elder brother to flight. In 
the weeks that followed Aurangzeb occupied Agra and confined Shah Jahan to the fort. He 
subsequently imprisoned Murad Bakhsh and took possession of Delhi. The victorious prince 
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spent the next two years in the pursuit and eventual defeat of his two remaining rivals. Dara 
Shukoh was betrayed into Aurangzeb’s hands and executed in August 1659, yet Shah Shuja 
continued the war effort from Bengal. After a string of defeats the prince eventually sought 
refuge in Arakan, where he is believed to have been killed in late 1660 after falling out with 
the Arakanese king.56 
The effects of these events were felt by the Company, since the crisis of imperial 
power at the centre caused authority to fragment locally. In Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, until 
the imperial army under Mir Jumla succeeded in driving out Shah Shuja, administrative 
control was temporarily divided between the prince’s officers and those of the new Mughal 
governor. Internal rebellion and aggression along the eastern borders further destabilized 
the region.57 The co-existence of two contesting power blocks along a rapidly shifting 
frontier posed pressing challenges to VOC merchants in the region. While the Company’s 
official policy was one of neutrality, in practice it proved impossible to maintain this position 
because the warring parties treated the Dutch as a welcome source of money and 
weaponry.58 This became most clear as the military balance shifted. Shah Shuja was dealt a 
crushing blow at Varanasi in February 1658. Later that year the prince undertook a second 
westward advance from Patna which was halted by Aurangzeb’s troops in January 1659 at 
the battle of Khajwa. In April 1659, the remnants of Shah Shuja’s retreating army were 
forced to abandon Rajmahal and withdraw to the eastern bank of the Ganges. However, 
aided by the strength of the Bengal flotilla, a turn of military fortunes took place during the 
summer months as Shah Shuja’s riverine forces managed to retake Rajmahal and advance 
against Mir Jumla. Successive confrontations continuing into 1660 once more forced Shah 
Shuja on the defensive, until, hopelessly outnumbered and with Aurangzeb’s generals in hot 
pursuit, he fled from the eastern capital of Dhaka in May 1660.59 
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Shah Shuja’s recovery of Hugli on 2 July 1659 drew the VOC into the heat of the 
conflict. Forces loyal to the Mughal prince, who had governed Bengal as subahdar since 
1639, plundered the town, killed its governor and other magistrates, and apprehended 
several administrators and merchants for their support to Mir Jumla. Among those detained 
were two VOC employees, the merchant Dirck Essinghs – acting as factory chief in the 
absence of directeur Mattheus van den Broeck – and the Indian broker Bhola Ram.60 After 
being forced to witness the decapitation of five dignitaries, the two men were threatened 
with the same punishment because the local VOC representation had, on the one hand, 
delivered five pieces of cannon to Mir Jumla and, on the other, refused to provide ships to 
the governor loyal to Shah Shuja. The Company had moreover turned down the prince’s 
request for a loan of 100,000 rupees.61 The prompt recovery of Hugli by the imperial army 
enabled Essinghs and Bhola Ram to escape unharmed, yet further difficulties ensued for the 
Company’s personnel in Dhaka. On 26 August 1659, troops belonging to Shah Shuja’s son 
Buland Akhtar attacked the Dutch factory, took 51,000 guilders in cash and goods, 
imprisoned the merchants François Santvoort and Harmen Voorburgh and two Dutch 
assistants, and killed one of their Indian servants.62 In an attempt to extort greater sums of 
money, the Dhaka merchants were told that the VOC servants in Hugli had been massacred 
and that they could expect to meet the same fate. The charge levelled against the Company 
was that the director of its trade in Bengal had not only gone off to visit Mir Jumla in his 
army camp but had also supplied him with eighteen pieces of cannon, two ships, and 
300,000 rupees in cash.63 
While the extent of their assistance was inflated, there was indeed plenty of reason to 
suspect that the Dutch were siding with Aurangzeb’s general, whom Van den Broeck was 
visiting when the take-over of Hugli took place.64 As years of experience had taught the 
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various European traders, Mir Jumla was uniquely able to exert pressure due to his 
extensive political and mercantile influence. At this point in time the VOC owed the nawab 
over 500,000 guilders borrowed to finance its Coromandel trade, with a further 400,000 
rupees received in Bengal in exchange for uncoined Japanese silver. The latter transaction 
enabled Dutch trade to proceed at a time when the mint in Rajmahal had ceased operation 
as a consequence of the war, another example of the importance of good relations with the 
nawab.65 Add to this the awkward circumstance that in 1658 the VOC had detained 25 
elephants belonging to Mir Jumla, and it becomes clear that the Dutch in Hugli were not in a 
position to turn down the general’s demands for cannon, gunpowder and gunners, despite 
being aware of the likely repercussions for their colleagues still residing under Shah Shuja’s 
jurisdiction.66 Using threats to bring Dutch trade in Bengal to a standstill, and having issued 
orders to that effect to his subordinate officers, Mir Jumla obtained cannons, gunpowder 
and sulphur from the Dutch ships anchored at Hugli. When, in December 1659, Shah Shuja 
made another temporary advance, Mir Jumla moreover made good use of the presence of 
Dutch ships for the safekeeping of seven chests of silver.67 In total the Company supplied at 
least eleven pieces of iron cannon and six bronze cannons to be deployed in the war, part of 
which it received back in 1661 and part of which remained among Mir Jumla’s possessions 
when the latter died in 1663.68 
Requests for men and materiel continued to mark the relationship between the VOC 
and Mir Jumla after the end of the succession war. In September 1660, Mir Jumla detained 
Dutch ships to pressure the Company into supplying assistance in his pursuit of Shah Shuja, 
while also demanding the service of a Dutch galliot for his expedition to establish imperial 
authority over Hijli, a small island in the Ganges estuary.69 Dutch sources claim that it was 
indeed the support offered by the yacht Ougly and its commander, Jan van Leenen, which 
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secured the eventual conquest of the island.70 Mir Jumla further leased Dutch shipbuilders, 
mariners, and the surgeon Gelmer Vosburg. This episode offers a helpful insight into the 
mechanics of the VOC’s diplomacy in Bengal. To begin with, because of his proximity to Mir 
Jumla, the Company regarded Vosburg as best placed to carry out day-to-day dealings with 
the nawab. In addition, Batavia expected the Dutch resident in Dhaka to visit Mir Jumla once 
a week. Finally, directeur Van den Broeck was expected to maintain contact through regular 
correspondence and the occasional gift, providing a good example of the division of labour 
in provincial diplomacy.71 Over and above these interactions, Mir Jumla also corresponded 
with the VOC’s Governor-General in letters conveyed through the Company’s factors in 
Bengal, a communication that again involved the issue of cannons.72 Only if and when 
matters could not be resolved locally did the VOC take its grievances to the emperor, as 
happened with its claim for compensation for the attack on the Dhaka factory which Van 
Adrichem unsuccessfully put forward during his embassy to Delhi.73 
In closing, it is helpful to return briefly to Shaista Khan’s Chittagong campaign. The 
viceroy’s dispatch of an envoy to Batavia was significant from a diplomatic-history point of 
view because it involved a rare instance of a seventeenth-century Mughal emissary 
travelling to the capital of a European Company-state. Whilst exchanges of ambassadors 
took place between Mughal emperors and Goa, such reciprocity was absent in relations 
between the imperial court and the East India Companies. The fact that the subahdar 
reached out on his personal initiative once more underlines that provincial diplomacy 
comprised a relatively independent sphere. On 3 March 1665, the envoy, one Khwaja 
Ahmad, presented his master’s gifts and letter at Batavia Castle. The Dutch reaped great 
benefit from their trade in Bengal, Shaista Khan wrote, yet they simultaneously traded in 
the lands of his enemies, the Magh pirates from Arakan. He threatened the Company that if 
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it did not close its Arakan factory and support his expedition with ships and cannons, the 
Dutch would be forced not only to leave Bengal but to cease their operations throughout 
the empire.74 While the Hoge Regering did decide to close its lodge in Arakan, it initially put 
off naval assistance on the grounds that the nawab’s request lacked sufficient practical 
detail. The governing council only consented in July 1666 after a second envoy sent by 
Shaista Khan had delivered a farman authorized by Aurangzeb.75 
Of particular interest are Batavia’s reasons for not establishing direct contact with the 
emperor to discuss his viceroy’s demands: ‘we have considered that the nawab in Bengal 
resides far from the court, and that if we forward the letter he sent us to His Majesty, and if 
[Shaista Khan] ends up being reprehended for it, […] he and his subaltern governors will 
make us feel the consequences in Bengal, while our complaints, as we have experienced 
repeatedly, will not carry much weight at court.’76 Doubtful of the efficacy of diplomacy at 
the central level of the Mughal administration, and cognizant of the fact that Company 
trade throughout Bengal depended on political cooperation from the subahdar and his 
subordinate officials, the Hoge Regering’s reasoning embodied the rationale behind 
provincial diplomacy as the VOC saw it. The Company continued to focus diplomatic efforts 
at the sub-state level, which was considered cheaper and less troublesome than diplomacy 
at the imperial court, while the attendant forms of political incorporation by the Mughal 
government of Bengal were deemed a price well worth paying for the substantial 
commercial benefits reaped from this prosperous region. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has dealt with the topic of provincial diplomacy through a focus on two 
episodes that highlight different aspects of the political and commercial relationship 
between the seventeenth-century East India Companies and the Mughal state. It has argued 
that the provincial setting is a vital albeit often neglected site to explore the place of the 
Companies in the Mughal political landscape, and that diplomacy offers an appropriate lens 
through which to analyse the complex politics of trade and violence that shaped Mughal–
European interactions. Many of the diplomatic arrangements that set the parameters for 
such interactions were worked out along the empire’s maritime frontier rather than at the 
centre, thus challenging notions of centre and periphery with regard to diplomatic decision-
making. This chapter has attempted to promote an integrated perspective on Company 
diplomacy that moves beyond an exclusive focus on formal embassies to the imperial court, 
by drawing attention to the importance of the Companies’ more frequent communication 
with provincial governments and the everyday practice of political interactions in port 
towns. 
As shown by my reading of William Bruton’s Newes from the East-Indies, the 
perspective of provincial diplomacy invites explorations of cross-cultural encounters on the 
basis of a category of Asian-European interactions that were regular and on the whole 
characterized by proximity rather than cultural distance. Whereas an older historiography 
has portrayed early Anglo–Mughal encounters as meetings between different diplomatic 
systems hampered by semiotic disparities, Ralph Cartwright’s reception by the nawab of 
Orissa instead points towards individuals operating within a common sphere of trade and 
politics according to established routines of interaction.77 Furthermore, both case studies 
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examined in this chapter underline the fundamental importance of Asian agency in shaping 
diplomatic interactions and arrangements. Initial trade agreements reached in the 1630s 
aligned with the economic and political interests of the provincial Mughal elites, while 
military upheaval during the late 1650s and early 1660s accelerated the co-opting of the 
Companies by the provincial Mughal authorities. Both go to show just how much the 
Companies depended on Indian political and commercial cooperation to advance their 
trade. 
As a closer look at the VOC’s position in mid-century Bengal makes clear, the 
perspective of provincial diplomacy is also useful in scrutinizing diplomacy’s blurred edges. 
When did a trading relationship shade into one of political vassalage, and when should we 
forego the prism of inter-state relations and think in terms of domestic frameworks for 
political solicitation instead? Answers to these questions will provide better insight into the 
diverse ways in which the Companies came to be incorporated into existing political 
structures across Asia. In much the same way that economic historians have positioned the 
role of East India Company trade within global networks of production and consumption, 
the study of Company diplomacy has the potential to highlight how macro-processes of 
global integration took shape through cross-cultural interactions in a variety of local sites.78 
Such future work is likely to accentuate the vital importance of the incentives, constraints, 
and power differentials encountered in various local contexts in shaping diplomatic 
relationships, and through the latter, the Companies’ larger commercial and political 
presence in early modern Asia. 
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